Testing for Endocrine Disruptors
As was pointed out in the Editorial in the last issue of ATLA, 3 there is currently much concern about chemicals which may adversely affect the endocrine system, leading to serious effects on wildlife and human beings alike. As a result, it is proposed that tens of thousands of chemicals should be screened, many of which would then have to be tested in in vitro and in vivo tests of various kinds, at enormous cost to industry and in terms of the lives of laboratory animals.
The primary cause of this activity is the application of the precautionary principle by the US Congress, and its requirement that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should develop a screening system for endocrine disruptors by the year 2000.
As a result, while there is no consensus on what endocrine disruptors actually are, and little evidence that they are the cause of the environmental or human health effects of concern (for example, breast cancer, reduction of sperm count), it is proposed that some of the currently available animal tests should be used for identifying chemicals with this activity. This is not because they have been shown to be useful for this particular purpose, but because their use is "biologically plausible".
It has even been said that the validation phase of the new test development, evaluation and acceptance sequence should be applied "flexibly" in this situation, because of the pressure being applied by the US Congress. Validation is concerned with the reliability and relevance of methods for a particular purposes. How can there possibly be flexibility about whether or not methods are reliable and relevant, and about what they should be used for? What would be the value of the data such tests would provide, and with what confidence could they be applied in making decisions?
Here, then, we are faced with the very worst kind of effect of the application of the precautionary principle: irresistible political pressure to act to provide substantiation of a plausible, but not yet established, hypothesis by applying plausible, but not yet adequately developed or validated, test procedures.
Testing High Production Volume Chemicals
Last October, the Clinton Administration, the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) jointly announced, in Washington DC, a 6-year programme to test 2800 major industrial chemicals for their health and environmental effects. 4 Pesticides, medicines and food additives are not included in the list.
The tests to be conducted will primarily be animal tests for acute toxicity, repeat dose toxicity, genetic toxicity, reproductive toxicity and developmental toxicity/teratogenicity. It is claimed that the total cost will be US$500-700 million.
The aim of the EDF is to overcome "toxic ignorance" by filling in data gaps in line with the check-list approach to toxicity testing. The EDF admits, however, that when all the tests are done, we will not necessarily be any safer, so more testing might be necessary. 5 It is likely, even probable or certain, that some of the 75,000 chemicals currently in use are more dangerous than we know, but is a production volume threshold of 1 million pounds per year the best way of deciding which of them should be subjected to further scrutiny and which should not? No, of course not. A more scientific approach, based on existing knowledge of the chemistry and toxicology of related compounds and likely levels of human exposure, would be much more intelligent.
One is left with the feeling that the CMA has been overwhelmed by the political force of the Clinton Administration (possibly in the form of the Vice-President), a threat that the EPA might withdraw approval of the manufacturing and marketing of their products, and pressure from the experienced campaigners of the EDF. The EDF even has an EDF Chemical Scorecard on the Internet, which will provide a regular update on the testing status of all the chemicals in the programme. 6 As in the case of the endocrine disruptors fiasco, traditional toxicologists with a vested interest in the continuation of check-list animal testing, and contract testing laboratories with a commercial interest in gaining new business, must be rejoicing. This is bad news for those who seek a scientifically rational approach to hazard prediction and risk assessment, and the development and use of alternative methods. Let us hope that the highly creditable TestSmart initiative of the Johns Hopkins Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing will enable some benefit to be gained from these events. 7
Genetic Manipulation
In the case of screening for endocrine disruptors and testing high production volume chemicals, it could be said that an apparently common sense approach in alliance with poor science is giving new hope of survival to the animal testing industry. However, there are other examples in which the implications of the breathtaking progress of molecular biology and cell biology, and the capacity to manipulate the genetics of living organisms, desperately need, but are not receiving to a sufficient extent, the application of something allied to the precautionary principle.
I will not discuss the use of genetically modified food plants, which is causing immense, and probably unnecessary, concern to a general public comparatively ignorant of what are, in my opinion, three much more dangerous situations, namely, the production of genetically modified animals suitable for providing organs for xenotransplantation to humans, the cloning of animals and, potentially, of humans, and the total mapping of the human genome.
Animal Organs as Transplants for Humans
One of the misfortunes of human life is that an individual's existence can be threatened by the failure of one of the major organs of the body, such as the heart, liver, kidneys or endocrine pancreas, while all the other organs would have worked well for many years to come. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the success of organ allotransplantation has been one of the great medical developments of recent decades.
However, the supply of organs for transplantation remains a problem, and it is claimed that one way of solving this difficulty would be to produce animals, such as pigs or even nonhuman primates, which have been genetically modified, so that their organs will be immunologically and physiologically acceptable as transplants in humans.
This proposal raises very important ethical issues and questions of animal welfare, but also grave potential threats to human health through the creation and uncontrollable spread of new diseases in humans. These issues have been thoroughly and expertly reviewed by Gill Langley and Joyce D'Silva in a report, Animal Organs in Humans: Uncalculated Risks and Unanswered Questions, recently published on behalf of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection and Compassion in World Farming. 8 Yet, such is the strength of the driving force for scientific progress and commercial success, there is a tendency among scientists to play down these potential problems, in a way which is diametrically opposed to the precautionary principle. Maybe the same attitude was shown by the scientists who were consulted about the production of cattle feed from animal offal. In Austria, the use of such "animal flour" was not permitted, in what with hindsight we can see was a spectacularly successful application of the precautionary principle. Austria has had no cases of BSE among its beef herds.
The Cloning of Animals and Humans
Last December, the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) published a report 9 on responses to a joint consultation document they had launched in January 1998, in which a series of questions were asked about nuclear replacement technology and whether, and if so under what circumstances, it should be applied to humans. In their report, the HGAC and the HFEA make further recommendations to the British Government, but consider that the current safeguards are sufficient to prevent human reproductive cloning in the UK, so that no legislation explicitly banning such cloning is necessary.
I do not agree with them, since, in my opinion, the relevant advisory bodies have consistently failed to recognise the seriousness of the ethical and safety problems raised by human embryo research and human genetic manipulation. This is an area where the precautionary principle approach is not specific enough or strong enough, and a clearer, firmer legal, ethical and scientific basis for controlling what should/should not be permitted should be laid down.
The Human Genome Project
As I was writing this Editorial, the British Medical Association (BMA) announced the publication of a report warning of the potential for misuse of genetic information in the production of biological and genetic weapons. 10, 11 The BMA fears that as the Human Genome Project advances and the whole human genome is eventually mapped, the knowledge provided could be used to develop weapons which would target particular ethnic groups. Recipes for developing biological weapons are already available on the Internet, so we can anticipate that the day will come when there will be similar recipes for developing genetic weapons.
Commenting on the report, Dr Vivienne Nathanson, the BMA's Head of Health Policy Research, said, "The history of humanity is a history of war. Scientific advances quickly lead to developments in weapons technology. Biotechnology and genetic knowledge are equally open to this type of malign use. Doctors and other scientists have an important role in prevention. They have a duty to persuade politicians and international agencies to take this report seriously and to take action to prevent the production of such weapons. "11 Sadly, even the most superficial examination of the history of science shows that we can be sure of two things. Firstly, that there will be politicians who will be keen to see that their countries are leaders in the development of any new types of weapons. Secondly, that there will be scientists willing to serve them. It is not easy to envisage what kinds of international safeguards could be set up to prevent the kinds of obscene developments feared by the BMA, or how they could be enforced. Nor is it clear what value the precautionary principle approach, however necessary, can have in these kinds of circumstances, where the original research would take place in secret.
Conclusions
1. The precautionary principle is a useful, common sense starting point when new issues of potential significance have to be confronted. However, strategies based on possible cause and effect relationships should only be acceptable for an interim and limited period, pending the outcome of scientific research designed to show whether or not the proposed relationships can be established satisfactorily and objectively.
2. The tests involved in this kind of research must themselves be independently shown to be valid, i.e. reliable and relevant, for their specified purposes. The application of methods merely because they are biologically plausible would be likely to compound the risk of maintaining plausible, but nevertheless erroneous, precautionary principle strategies, with serious economic, social, human health and environmental consequences.
3. The application of the precautionary principle should not be limited to situations which might threaten the general environment or human health through industrial activity. If the precautionary approach has any merits, it should be no less forcefully applied to scientific research which might itself threaten the environment or human health (for example, through the inadvertent creation of new diseases).
4. The precautionary principle should also be applied within an acceptable ethical framework, in order to prevent, for example, the manipulation of the human genome or knowledge of the human genome in ways which are morally unacceptable, and to prevent the use of laboratory animals (including transgenic animals 12 ) in procedures which might cause them unnecessary and unjustifiable pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm. P.S. The Times (25 January 1999) reported that Dr Craig Venter, of Celera Genomics Corporation, told the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, on 24 January in Anaheim, California, USA, that scientists will be able to create artificial life within 10 years. The result would be "a stripped down and entirely man-made version of a parasite commonly found in the human body". Dr Venter said that he would not attempt this, "unless, after careful consideration, a committee of experts agreed that the benefits of creating life exceeded the risks". He also said that "the danger with the technology is that it might be misused to create biological weapons, but the positive side is potentially greater". Quem deus perdere vult, prius dementat.
The comments expressed in this Editorial reflect the personal views of the author.
